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Abstract
We identify weakenings of the independence axiom of Nash (1950) to
derive a solution without disagreement point. The idea is to determine
disagreement points simultaneously with the solutions, and as a function of
the utility space only. Our version of the Nash solution maximizes the Nash
product w.r.t. both the solution and the disagreement point. We show
that that no other restriction on independence axiom can be reconciled
with continuity axiom while still obtaining a uniquely defined solution. A
similar alteration of the monotonicity axiom of Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975)
is introduced.
JEL: C71, C78.
Keywords: No disagreement, Bargaining theory, Axioms.
1 Introduction
Since Nash (1950), a bargaining problem is characterized by two principal geo-
metric properties: a utility set on the domain of utility vectors, and a disagree-
ment point in the utility set. A bargaining solution is rule that assigns a unique
solution to each bargaining problem. The solution is typically sensitive to both
of its arguments; change in the disagreement point’s position typically aﬀects
the solution.
The existence of a disagreement point can be motivated on many grounds.
The most popular is the impassé-interpretation: disagreement point reflects
what players get if they do not reach an agreement. The relative magnitudes
of losses are then thought to aﬀect players’ negotiation power. Moreover, since
any player can always guarantee his disagreement level of utility by refusing to
negotiate, the diagreement point defines a lower bound of the solution. From
the modeling angle, the disagreement outcome helps one to anchor the analysis.
Without disagreement outcome or equivalent predetermined and fixed device,
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multi valuedness of a solution would become an immediate problem of most of
the solutions. Finally, existence of a disagreement point is useful since it endows
one with a natural reference point from where utility comparisons can be made.
Many if not most prominent solutions are based on utility comparisons.
However, in many interesting scenarios assuming the existence of a disagree-
ment point is disturbing. In fact, the impassé-interpretation stands in a sharp
contradiction with Pareto optimality, the axiom that probably enjoys most gen-
eral acceptance. How can players be threatened by the disagreement outcome if
they are, at the outset, assumed to reach the Pareto frontier? The Coase The-
orem argues that a Pareto-dominated disagreement outcome can never prevail
if rational players cannot commit not to continue negotiations. Thus, if one
assumes that disagreement outcome can eﬀectively be reached, then one also
needs to assume that players can commit not to continue negotiations. What
happens if it is common knowledge that players lack any such commitment
power?
In practice, the more serious problem with disagreement point is that there
is no universally accepted criterion how to pick one. As the solution is sen-
sitive to the position of the disagreement outcome, it follows, paradoxically,
that once the solution has been identified one still needs to cope with the
disagreement point selection problem (see Kalai and Rosenthal, 1978, for an
elegant noncooperative solution to this problem). This problem manifests itself
in noncooperative games. For example, in repeated games and situations where
correlated strategies are feasible (e.g. Aumann 1974), equilibrium selection is
a fundamental problem. As the set of equilibrium utilities is a convex set, a
bargaining model could ideally be used as an equilibrium selection device (this
idea is advanced e.g. by Luce and Raiﬀa, 1957). Applicability of the bargain-
ing model is crucially hampered by the fact that there is no criterion to choose
which equilibrium should play the role of the disagreement outcome. In fact,
choosing the ”disagreement equilibrium” should be as diﬃcult as choosing the
desirable equilibrium itself.
Defining the bargaining solution without a reference to a disagreement point,
or an axiomatization which generates such point simultaneously with the ac-
tual solution, would constitute a remedy to the problem. This is the aim of
this paper. We construct an axiomatization that allows one to remove the dis-
agreement point altogether from the definition of the problem. Moreover, when
comes to characterizing our extended Nash solution, we show that our axioma-
tization is essentially the only way to derive the solution. We believe that our
results could be very useful in applied literature wherever disagreement point’s
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position is diﬃcult to determine.
The central property of our axiomatization is that we simply remove the
disagreement point from the definition of the symmetry axiom (which is the
only axiom where the disagreement point enters in Nash’s system). Given
this strenghtening of the symmetry axiom, both Nash and KS axiomatizations
become too tight: no solution satisfies them. To solve this problem, we first
restrict the domain where Nash’s independence (IIA) axiom binds. Thus we
introduce a restricted IIA (RIIA).
We first show that the unique solution that satisfies Nash’s axioms with
altered symmetry and IIA axioms is the utility vector (u∗1, u
∗
s) that maximizes
together with some (d∗1, d
∗
2) the Nash product (u1 − d1)(u2 − d2) with respect
to both (u1, u2) and (d1, d2) in utility set U. Outcome (u∗1, u
∗
s) is called the
extended Nash solution of U . Extended Nash solution is single valued almost
everywhere. Thus the disagreement point (d∗1, d
∗
2) is in our model is determined
”endogenously” and simultaneously with the solution (u∗1, u
∗
2).
We then show that IIA cannot be weakened in any other way if one wants
the solution to be unique almost always, and derivable from somehow restricted
IIA and other standard axioms. More precisely, if one wants to drop the dis-
agreement point from the description of the model, and finds uniqueness of the
solution along with continuity, Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale invariance
and somehow restricted version of IIA appealing, then RIIA is the only ac-
ceptable axiom. Consequently, the extended Nash solution is the only feasible
solution with somehow restricted IIA.
The extended Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) (1977) solution is based on a similar
logic. We remove the disagreement point from the symmetry axiom and weaken
the monotonicity axiom by restricting the domain where it binds. Where
the standard KS solution is characterized by the intersection of the Pareto-
boundary and the line segment joining disagreement point to the ”utopia” point,
defined by the jointly maximal utilities of both players, our version of the so-
lution picks the point in the intersection of the Pareto-boundary and the line
segment joining the ”utopia” point to the ”anti-utopia” point, defined by the
jointly minimal utilities of both players. Again, the disagreement point is de-
termined ”endogenously” by restricting the monotonicity axiom appropriately.
The driving force of the result is the extended use of symmetry properties.
That is, we do not only appeal to the symmetry axiom that is defined w.r.t.
positively sloped diagonal, but also to the inverse problem which is symmetric
w.r.t. negatively sloped diagonal. This allows us demand that under inversely
symmetric conditions a solution to the problem and its inverse must coincide.
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This in turn gives us enough powetr to pin donwn the solution. Inverse sym-
metry is not needed whenever the disagreement point is fixed.
We begin with specifying the model. Then we introduce the axiomatic
system, and characterize the extended Nash solution. In the third section,
we establish that our restriction is the only feasible one. The final section
introduces an extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
2 The Model
Let U = {U ⊂ R2 : U compact and convex}. In particular, U contains all
problems of zero measure. Note that almost every convex problem is also strictly
convex. A bargaining solution is a non-empty, convex valued mapping F :
U → R2 such that F (U) ⊆ U for all U ∈ U . The properties, or axioms, we
are interested the solution to satisfy include the following. Denote the Pareto
frontier by P (U) = {u ∈ U : v > u implies v /∈ U}.1
PAR (Pareto-eﬃciency) F (U) ⊂ P (U), for all U ∈ U .
Use notation aU+b = {(a1u1+b1, a2u2+b2) : (u1, u2) ∈ U, (a1, a2), (b1, b2) ∈
R2}. In particular, write (−1,−1)U = −U.
INV (Scale Invariance) F (aU + b) = aF (U) + b, for a ∈ R2++, b ∈ R2, for all
U ∈ U .
To describe symmetric conditions, denote U 0 := {(u2, u1) ∈ R2 : (u1, u2) ∈
U}, for any U ∈ U .
ESYM (Extended symmetry) U = U 0 implies F1(U) = F2(U), for all U ∈ U .
Thus, in the extended symmetric case F contains an element in the diag-
onal. If F is single valued, ESYM requires that F1(U) = F2(U) in symmetric
problems. Observe that because of the absence of the disagreement point, this
version of ESYM is stronger than the usual one which restricts the solution
only when the disagreement point is equal to (0, 0).
2.1 The Extended Nash
RIIA (Restricted Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) F (V ) ∪ F (−V ) ⊆
U ∩ (−U) and U ⊆ V implies F (V ) = F (U), for all U, V ∈ U .
1Vector inequalities: for u, v ∈ R2, u = v means u−v ∈ R2+; u ≥ v means u = v 6= u; u > v
means u− v ∈ R2++.
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Whenever RIIA binds, it necessarily also means that F (−U) = F (−V ), and
−F (U) = −F (V ). Note well that RIIA is weaker than the usual IIA condition
which in the current context can be stated as follows: let F (V ) ⊆ U and U ⊆ V ,
then F (V ) = F (U). Thus, if one views Nash’s IIA axiom acceptable, then RIIA
should be acceptable as well.
Construct a new solution as follows: define a correspondence (FN ,D) : U →
R2 ×R2 where
(FN ,D)(U) = argmax
(u,v)∈U×U
(u1 − v1)(u2 − v2), for all U ∈ U . (1)
The geometry of (FN ,D)(U) ⊆ U×U meeting (1) will play influential role in the
analysis. W.l.o.g., let fN ≥ d for all fN ∈ FN , d ∈ D. The diﬀerence between
FN and the standard Nash solution is that the latter is a solution to program (1)
with some fixed D = d. In contrast, in our model D is determined endogenously,
and simultaneously with FN . However, FN and D have interpretation of being
one anothers’ ”dual” solutions, as the following parity manifests:
FN(U) = −D(−U), FN(−U) = −D(U). (2)
Moreover, it is clear that (FN ,D)(U) = (FN ,D)(V ) if U ⊆ V and (FN ,D)(V ) ⊆
U × U. In particular, note that if U = −U, then
FN (U) = −D(−U) = FN (−U) = −D(U).
In such case, FN (U) andD(U) draw a line segment of equal length and slope, at
the opposite sides of the origin. Thus, the convex hull of points in FN(U) and
D(U), denoted by co(FN(U),D(U)), is a parallelogram whose diagonals run
through the origin. Finally, note that (FN ,D)(U) contains a unique element
almost everywhere: for example, F (U) is single valued if U is strictly convex,
has continuously diﬀerentiable Pareto-frontier, or if U does not contain any two
parallel line segments in its exterior surface. I.e. the solution is generically
unique for bargaining problems arising from correlated equilibria of a finite
normal form game, or equilibria of a repeated finite normal form game.
To characterize geometrically the solution, note that if F (U) = F (−U) =
{(1, 1)} and there is a tangent of U and −U with slope −1, running through
(1, 1), then F (U) = FN (U). To see why, fix D(U) = {(−1,−1)} and derive the
standard Nash solution (1, 1). The tangency of U at (1, 1) has the slope −1. By
(2), the inverse problem has the same property.
Theorem 1 F satisfies PAR, INV, ESYM and RIIA if and only if F = FN .
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Proof. First we argue that FN satisfies PAR, INV, ESYM and RIIA. Seeing
that FN meets PAR, INV and ESYM is obvious. We check RIIA. Suppose that
U ⊂ V and FN (V ) ∪ FN(−V ) ⊆ U ∩ (−U), for some U, V ∈ U . By (2),
(−D(V )) ⊆ U ∩ (−U). Multiplying both sides by −1 gives D(V ) ⊆ (−U) ∩ U .
Thus (FN ,D)(V ) ⊆ U × U . Therefore, (FN ,D)(U) = (FN ,D)(V ), and RIIA
holds.
Now we argue that if F satisfies PAR, INV, ESYM and RIIA, then F (T ) =
FN (T ), for all T ∈ U . Identify the element (fN , d)(U) of (FN ,D)(U) such that,
for i = 1, 2,
fNi (U) =
supFNi (U) + inf F
N
i (U)
2
,
di(U) =
supDi(U) + infDi(U)
2
.
Take T and let U = aT + b where
ai :=
2
fNi (T )− di(T )
, bi := −
fNi (T ) + di(T )
fNi (T )− di(T )
, i = 1, 2.
Then, fN (U) = −d(U) = (1, 1). By INV, it now suﬃces to show that FN (U) is
the only solution for U meeting PAR, ESYM, and RIIA. With this normaliza-
tion, (1, 1) = fN (U) = fN (−U) ∈ FN(U) = FN (−U) Identify2
V = co(U ∪ (−U) ∪ U 0 ∪ (−U 0)).
Clearly such V belongs to U , satisfies V = −V = V 0 = −V 0, and runs through
points (1, 1) and (−1,−1). Moreover U ⊆ V, and fN(U) = fN(V ) = fN(−V ).
By ESYM and PAR, fN (U) ∈ F (V ) = F (−V ). This and convexity of F imply
that F (V ) ⊆ FN(V ) = FN(U). Thus F (V ) = F (−V ) ⊂ U ∩ (−U) and, by
RIIA, F (U) = F (V ). From these we conclude that F (U) ⊆ FN (U). We still
need to establish the other direction.
Suppose that F (U) 6= FN (U). Since U ⊆ V, and FN (V ) = FN (−V ) ⊂
U∩(−U), it must be that F (V ) 6= FN (V ). By SYM, FN (V )\F (V ) = (FN (V )\
F (V ))0. Identify a rectangle V¯ ⊂ V such that V¯ :=co(FN(V ),D(V )). As V¯ =
−V¯ and F (V ) = F (−V ) ⊂ V¯ , it follows by RIIA that F (V¯ ) = F (V ). Now
there is a rectangle T¯ 6= V such that T¯ ∪ (−T¯ ) = V¯ and co(F (V¯ ),−F (V¯ )) ⊂ T¯ .
By multiplying both sides by −1, we have co(F (V¯ ),−F (V¯ )) ⊂ −T¯ . By RIIA
this implies that F (T¯ ) = F (−T¯ ) = F (V¯ ). However, T¯ = −T¯ +c for some c 6= 0.
Thus, by INV, F (T¯ ) = F (−T¯ ) + c, a contradiction.
2coA = convex hull of A.
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The necessity part of the proof runs as follows. Suppose U is smooth so
that FN is the single valued and denote fN = FN . Normalize the situation
such that (1, 1) = fN(U) = fN (−U). Identify the convex hull V of the union of
U, the inverse of U , the transpose of U, and the inverse transpose of U. Then V
is symmetric and by construction (1, 1) = f(U). Thus f = fN . A slightly more
elaborate argument is needed in the non-generic case where U is non-smooth
and FN set valued.
(-1,-1)
U
-U
(1,1) = FN(U) = FN(-U) U’
-U’
Figure 1
As discussed above, the only cases where FN may obtain multiple values
are the degenerate ones where U has parallel flat sides. Let U∗ ⊂ U satisfy the
restriction
U∗ = {U ∈ U : (FN ,D)(U) is singleton}.
Thus, U∗ contains all strictly convex problems. With this domain restriction,
the next corollary follows immediately from the previous theorem. Let fN be
defined as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Corollary 2 Under domain U∗, F satisfies PAR, INV, ESYM and RIIA if and
only if F = {fN}.
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To verify this result one only needs to establish that if U ∈ U∗ such that
(F˜ , D˜)(U) = {((1, 1), (−1,−1))}, then there is a symmetric problem V ∈ U∗
that contains U , where V is not a rectangle. To see that such always exists,
take V˚ := {u ∈ R2 : u21 + u22 ≤ 2} (an origin-centered ball with radius
√
2),
and a rectangle V c that contains U. Then there is small enough λ ∈ (0, 1) such
that V λ := V˚ λ+V c(1−λ) contains U. As V˚ is strictly convex, so is V λ, for all
λ ∈ (0, 1). Thus V λ ∈ U∗.
3 Alternative characterizations
3.1 Bounded domain
For simplicity we focus on domain U∗ where set valued solution is not needed.
Admittedly, unlike IIA, RIIA does not have natural interpretation. Why should
IIA be restricted only in the domain of RIIA and not in other problems, or why
should the restriction bind in all the problems defined by RIIA? It is clear,
however, that if one finds the logic of IIA appealing, and wants to remove a
fixed disagreement point but not to give up the other Nash axioms, then the
domain of IIA must to be restricted somehow. Would there be any other way
to weaken the IIA condition and still obtain a unique solution? The aim of this
section is to show that under plausible conditions the answer to this question
is negative.
Take a partial order Σ ⊆ {(U,V ) ∈ U∗×U∗ : U ⊂ V }, and assume that IIA
binds only on Σ. Thus we get the Σ-restricted version of the IIA.
Σ−RIIA If f(V ) ∈ U, then f(V ) = f(U) for all (U, V ) ∈ Σ.
Instead of RIIA, we assume that a natural solution meets Σ−RIIA, for some
Σ, and is continuous in the following sense.
CON (Continuity) If sequence {Uk}∞k=1 ⊂ U converges in the Hausdorf metric,
then {f(Uk)}∞k=1 ⊂ R2 converges in the Euclidean metric.
We say U 0 is bounded if there is c ∈ R+ such that |u| ≤ c for all U 0.
Lemma 3 Let bargaining solution f be unique and satisfy PAR, INV, ESYM,
CON and Σ−RIIA on bounded U∗. Then f = fN .
Proof. Take U , identify f(U), f(−U) and, by INV, adopt normalization
f(U) = f(−U) = (1, 1).3 Choose V 0 = U. Uniqueness of f(V 0) is a consequence
3For any T , use scales U = aT + b such that ai := 2(fi(T )− fi(−T ))−1, bi := −(fi(T ) +
fi(−T ))(fi(T )− fi(−T )), for i = 1, 2.
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of either ESYM and PAR, or Σ−RIIA and PAR: either there is (V 0, V 1) ∈ Σ
such that f(V 1) = (1, 1), or V 0 is symmetric, in which case choose V 0 = V 1.
Sequence {V k} constructed this way has the property that V k ⊂ V k+1 and
f(V k) = (1, 1) for all k = 0, 1, ... . Since U∗ is bounded, every sequence of {V k}
converges in the Hausdorf metric to some V ∗ ∈ U∗. By CON, f(V ∗) = (1, 1).
Since f(V ∗) is unique, and since there is no V 0 ∈ U∗ such that (V ∗, V 0) ∈ Σ
and f(V 0) = (1, 1), it follows that V ∗ must be symmetric. Since V k ⊂ V ∗ for
all k, we have U ⊂ V ∗.
Conversely, use the same argument to identify symmetric V¯ ∗ such that
−U ⊂ V¯ ∗ and f(V¯ ∗) = f(−V¯ ∗) = (1, 1). Then also V ∗ ∩ (−V¯ ∗) is symmetric
and, by multiplying by (−1), U ⊂ V ∗ ∩ (−V¯ ∗). Since f(U) = f(−U) = (1, 1),
we have f(U) = fN(U).
(-1,-1)
U
-U
(1,1) = FN(U) = FN(-U)
V1
V*V
k
c
c
-c
-c
*V
Figure 2
The proof is based on the idea that any uniquely determined solution on U must
use ESYM and PAR, or Σ−RIIA to pin down the solution. The latter implies
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that there is a utility set containing U with uniquely determined solution. Thus,
inductively, we get a sequence of nested utility sets U, V 1, ..., V k, ... (see Fig.
2) that ordered by RIIA. By boundedness of the utility space, such sequence
converges. The convergent point V ∗ must be a symmetric utility set. By
continuity, the solution of U then equals fN(V ∗). As the same applies to the
inverse problem we can, after normalizing U such that fN (U) = fN (−U) =
fN(V ∗), identify the intersection of the two convergent utility sets. As both of
them are symmetric, the intersection is symmetric as well. Thus the solution
of both U and −U equals fN (V ∗).
Define ΣN = {(U, V ) ∈ U∗ × U∗ : U ⊂ V, fN (V ), fN(−V ) ∈ U ∩ (−U)}.
Then, by Theorem 1, fN satisfies PAR, INV, ESYM and ΣN−RIIA on U∗.
Thus, from Lemma 3 we have the following.
Theorem 4 Unique single valued solution f can be characterized by PAR, INV,
ESYM, CON and Σ−RIIA on bounded U∗, for some Σ, if and only if f = fN .
Boundedness of U∗ is clearly a questionable restriction given that play-
ers’ behavior should be independent on their vNM scales. However any con-
dition that guarantees that V k sequence, V k being symmetric with (1, 1) ∈
P (V k)∩P (−V k), does not enlarge without a bound could be used instead. For
example, ruling out too ”thin” U ’s would suﬃce (e.g. by requiring that re-
lation − [maxu,v∈U
Q
(ui − vi)] [minu,v∈U
Q
(ui − vi)]−1 lies above some strictly
positive number, for all U). Such restriction is clearly independent of the utility
scales.
3.2 Endogenous reference point
Another way to get rid of boundedness of U∗ is to appeal the axiom of inde-
pendency of nonindividually rational alternatives, where the level of minimally
individually rational outcomes can be arbitrary (but equal between the players).
Of course, such condition would require the existence of a reference outcome.
In this subsection, we develop a model where a reference outcome is derived
endogenously, and together with the actual solution. Thus, the diﬀerence be-
tween the reference outcome and a disagreement outcome is that the reference
outcome need not be fixed.
First we define an endogenoud reference point. Such point is then used only
to rule out the nonindividually rational outcomes. Let the reference point be a
function d : U∗ → R2 such that d(U) ∈ U for all U ∈ U∗. Then pair (f, d)(U)
constitutes the solution and the reference point for U. First we extend some of
the preceding conditions to take into account the existence of a reference point.
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The most acceptable extension concern INV, ESYM and CON: formation of
the reference point should be governed by the same principles than the solution
(add D to all conditions to refer d function).
DINV (f, d)(aU + b) = a(f, d)(U) + b, for a ∈ R2++, b ∈ R2, for all U ∈ U .
DESYM U = U 0 implies (f1, d1)(U) = (f2, d2)(U), for all U ∈ U .
DCON If sequence {Uk}∞k=1 ⊂ U converges in the Hausdorf metric, then
{(f, d)(Uk)}∞k=1 ⊂ R2 converges in the Euclidean metric.
The following condition is, perhaps, more subtle. It says that if IIA binds
for f under (U, V ), given restriction Σ, then IIA should bind for d also.
Σ−DRIIA If f(V ) ∈ U, then (f, d)(V ) = (f, d)(U) for all (U,V ) ∈ Σ.
Write Ud = {u ∈ U : u ≥ d}. Now we state the condition that diﬀerentiates
this model from the previous subsection.
INIR (f, d)(U) = (f 0, d0) implies (f, d)(Ud0) = (f 0, d0).
Lemma 5 Let f be unique and satisfy PAR, DINV, DESYM, DCON, Σ−DRIIA
and INIR. Then f = fN .
Proof. As in Theorem 3, let U = V 0 and construct sequence {V k} such that
V k ⊂ V k+1 and f(V k) = (1, 1) for all k = 0, 1, ... . By Σ−DRIIA, d(V k) = δ for
all k. Sequence {V kδ } converges in the Hausdorf metric to some V ∗δ ∈ U∗. By
INIR, (f, d)(V kδ ) = ((1, 1), δ) for all k and, by DCON, (f, d)(V ∗δ ) = ((1, 1), δ).
Since f(V ∗δ ) is unique, and since there is no V
0 ∈ U∗ such that (V ∗δ , V 0) ∈ Σ
and f(V 0) = (1, 1), it follows that V ∗δ must be symmetric. Since V
k
δ ⊂ V ∗δ for
all k, we have Uδ ⊂ V ∗δ .
Conversely, identify d(−V k) = δ¯ for all k and symmetric V¯ ∗δ¯ such that
−Uδ¯ ⊂ V¯ ∗δ¯ and f(V¯
∗
δ¯ ) = (1, 1). Then co{V ∗δ ∩ (−V¯ ∗δ¯ )} is symmetric and co{Uδ ∩
(−Uδ¯)} ⊂co{V ∗δ ∩ (−V¯ ∗δ¯ )}. Since f(Uδ) = f(−Uδ¯) = (1, 1), we have fN(co{Uδ ∩
(−Uδ¯)}) = fN (−co{Uδ ∩ (−Uδ¯)}) = (1, 1). As co{Uδ ∩ (−Uδ¯)} ⊂ U, we have, by
the same token, f(U) = fN(U).
Hence, we have shown that boundedness of the utility space can be replaced
with INIR defined with repect to endogenous reference point to obtain that
RIIA is unique admissable restriction on IIA, if one wants the single valued
solution to satisfy the other standard Nash axioms. Again, defining d(U) =
−fN(−U) for all U ∈ U∗ we have, by Theorem 1, that fN satisfies PAR,
DINV, DESYM and ΣN−DRIIA on U∗.
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Theorem 6 Unique single valued solution f can be characterized by PAR,
DINV, DESYM, DCON, Σ−DRIIA on U∗, for some Σ, if and only if f = fN .
4 The Extended Kalai-Smorodinsky
In this section, we construct in a similar spirit a solution that is based on
restricted version of monotonicity by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975). There is
no need to allow set valued solutions, hence we focus on single valued solution
f on U . Define mi(U) = max{ui : u ∈ U} and mi(U) = min{ui : u ∈ U}, and
let m(U) = (m1(U),m2(U)), m(U) = (m1(U),m2(U)), for i ∈ {1, 2}, U ∈ U .
Note that necessarily m(U) = −m(−U).
RMON (Restricted Individual Monotonicity) mi(V ) = mi(U), mj(V ) = mj(U)
and U ⊆ V implies fj(V ) ≥ fj(U), for all i 6= j, U, V ∈ U .
Again, RIIA is weaker condition than the usual MON, which binds only
when mi(V ) = mi(U) and U ⊆ V. Thus, if one views MON acceptable, then
RMON should be acceptable as well. Note that condition RMON can equiv-
alently be stated as follows: mi(V ) = mi(U), mj(V ) = mj(U) and U ⊆ V
implies fi(−V ) ≥ fi(−U), or mj(−V ) = mj(−U), mi(−V ) = mi(−U) and
U ⊆ V implies fj(V ) ≥ fj(U), for i 6= j, U, V ∈ U .
Let I(u, v) be the line segment joining u, v ∈ R2. Solution fKS : U →R2 is
then defined as follows
fKS(U) = I(m(U),m(U)) ∩ P (U), for all U ∈ U .
Note that fSK is single valued, and that
fKS(U),−fKS(−U) ∈ I(m(U),m(U)) ∩ U. (3)
Theorem 7 f satisfies PAR, INV, SYM and RMON if and only if f = fKS .
Proof. First we argue that fKS satisfies PAR, INV, SYM and RMON. See-
ing that fKS meets PAR, INV and SYM is obvious. We check RMON. Suppose
mi(V ) = mi(U), mj(V ) = mj(U) and U ⊆ V, for some U, V ∈ U . Hence, it fol-
lows that mi(V ) ≥ mi(U), mj(V ) ≤ mj(U) and, therefore fKSj (V ) ≥ fKSj (U).
Now we argue that if f satisfies PAR, INV, SYM and RMON, then f(U) =
fKS(U), for all U ∈ U . Take U , identify (m,m)(U) ∈ R2 × R2, and adopt
normalization m(U) = −m(U) = (1, 1).4 By INV, it suﬃces to show that
4For any T , use scales U = aT + b such that ai := 2(mi(T ) −mi(T ))−1, bi := (mi(T ) +
mi(T ))(mi(T )−mi(T ))−1, i = 1, 2.
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PAR, SYM, and RMON imply that f(U) = fSK(U). Construct set V :=co{U,
(1,−1), (−1, 1)}. Note that, by construction, P (V ) = P (U) and (m,m)(V ) =
(m,m)(U) implying that fKS(U) = fKS(V ). Moreover, U ⊆ V. Then, by
RMON, f(V ) ≥ f(U). As, by PAR, f(V ) ∈ P (V ), it follows that f(U) =
f(V ). Thus we only need to show that necessarily f(V ) = fKS(V ). Note
that fKS(−U) = fKS(−V ). Construct set Vˆ :=co{fKS(V ), (1,−1), (−1, 1),
−fKS(−V )}. Then, by (3), Vˆ is symmetric and Vˆ ⊆ V . By SYM and PAR
it follows that f(Vˆ ) = fKS(Vˆ ) = fKS(V ). By RMON it follows that f(V ) =
fKS(V ), as required.
(1,1)
(-1,-1)
U
fKS(U) = fKS(V)
-fKS(-U) = -fKS(-V)
V
U
Figure 3.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this note we have argued that inverse symmetry can be exploited to re-
move the disagreement point from the characterization of the bargaining prob-
lem. The solutions have been derived by weakening the independence and
monotonicity axioms of Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky. Introduced solutions
could have value in contexts where the position of a disagreement point cannot
be justified.
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The well know criticism against IIA, and the many substitute axiomatiza-
tions of the Nash solution, peg the question whether it is possible to remove
the disagreement point and obtain a unique solution without appealing to IIA
altogetheter.
Dagan at. al. (2002) show that IIA can be replaced with three conditions,
independence of non-individually rational alternatives (INIR), twisting, which
is a monotonicity requirement, and disagreement point convexity (DPC). INIR
could be replaced with a condition that uses endogenous reference point, as in
our Lemma 5. Disagreement point concavity is more diﬃcult to replace with
another, restricted, condition. In the end, the reference point should coincide
with the inverse problem’s solution, which leaves the condition with much less
power.
Chun and Thomson (1990) in turn replace IIA with INIR, CON and DPC.
Peters and van Damme (1991) assume INRA, individual rationality, DPC and
a starshaped inverse condition (in the language of Thomson, 1991). In addition
to DPC facing the diﬃculties described above, what is problemetic with these
two characterizations is that they are defined with respect to the class of com-
prehensive problems. The extended Nash solution, on the other hand, is not
defined in below unbounded utility space. Moreover, full domain of utility sets
is also needed.
Lensberg (1988) shows that in the multiple players game IIA and symme-
try can be replaced with consistency and anonymity. Again, his construction
heavily relies on the comprehensiveness of the utility set. Nevertheless, as the
underlying logic of consistency works much like IIA, it is plausible that a re-
stricted version of it could be used to characterioze the extended Nash solution.
Mariotti (1999) introduces a maximal symmetry axiom which, in spirit, has
connections to our construction. Maximal symmetry requires that a solution
with relabeled player names should belong to the original utility space. Mar-
riotti shows that maximal symmetry and strong individual rationality can be
used to replace IIA. Moreover, his characterization does not require excessive
domain assumptions. It is plausible that some (restricted) version of maximal
symmetry could replace RIIA in our construction.
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